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Benefit or Burden?:
Brackeen v. Zinke and the Constitutionality
of the Indian Child Welfare Act
KATIE L. GOJEVIC
Officials seemingly would rather place Indian children in nonIndian settings where their Indian culture, their Indian traditions
and, in general, their entire Indian way of life is smothered . . .
[Agencies] strike at the heart of Indian communities by literally
stealing Indian children. This course can only weaken rather than
strengthen the Indian child, the family, and the community . . . It
has been called cultural genocide.1

***
[T]his is the first time ever that a federal statute enacted to benefit
Indians has been found to be unconstitutional on the grounds of
equal protection . . . this is not just an effort to undermine ICWA, but
to undermine all Indian law.2

1. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing Before the United States Senate
Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 2 (1977) [hereinafter ICWA
Hearing] (statement of James Abourezk, Senator, Chairman of the Committee).
Congress passed ICWA the following year.
2. Dan Lewerenz, quoted in Meagan Flynn, Court Strikes Down Native
American Adoption Law, Saying It Discriminates Against Non-Native Americans,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morn
ing-mix/wp/2018/10/10/court-strikes-down-native-american-adoption-law-saying
-it-discriminates-against-non-native-americans/?utm_term=.a032d27b3e41.
Mr. Lewerenz was an attorney-advisor for the U.S. Department of the Interior,
Office of the Solicitor, Division of Indian Affairs before becoming a staff attorney
with the Native American Rights Fund. Dan Lewerenz, Staff Attorney, NARF,
https://www.narf.org/profiles/dan-lewerenz/.
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The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) governs the
custody and adoption of Native American children as well as
termination, both voluntary and involuntary, of Native
American parental rights.3 Congress enacted ICWA in 1978
as a response to the high number of Native American
children who were removed from their homes and placed
with white families and into institutions.4 In the Supreme
Court’s 2013 decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the
majority stated that an interpretation of ICWA that allowed
a father who had not supported his child in utero to “play his
ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the
mother’s decision” to place that child for adoption would raise
equal protection concerns.5 The Court held that ICWA did
not apply to a Native American parent who had never had
custody of the child in question.6 After this decision, various
organizations, both those opposed to ICWA and those who
argued against Native American sovereignty in general,
began to file lawsuits arguing that ICWA as a whole was
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.7 Five years
after Adoptive Couple, in Brackeen v. Zinke, one such lawsuit
resulted in a Texas district court holding that parts of ICWA
are unconstitutional.8 The court found that not only did parts
of ICWA violate equal protection, but also that some of the
challenged portions violate the Tenth Amendment’s “anticommandeering doctrine” and the Indian Commerce Clause.9

3. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012). ICWA applies to all child custody cases
that involve a child who is either a member of a Native American tribe or who is
eligible for such membership.
4. About ICWA, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASSOCIATION, https://
www.nicwa.org/about-icwa/.
5. 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013).
6. Id. at 653–54.
7. Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, Racial Anxieties in Adoption: Reflections
on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the
ICWA, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 750–54 (2017).
8. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 546 (2018).
9. Id. at 541.

2020]

BENEFIT OR BURDEN?

249

Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Court at first issued a ruling overturning the district court’s
decision10 on ICWA’s constitutionality, the Fifth Circuit
granted rehearing en banc in November of 2019.11
Part I of this Note discusses the reasoning behind
Congress’ creation of ICWA and notable Supreme Court
decisions dealing with this Act, as well as the Multiethnic
Placement Act’s intersection with ICWA. Part II contains a
detailed discussion of Brackeen. Part III contains an analysis
of Brackeen, along with the foreseeable detrimental effects of
this decision that extend beyond adoption cases.
I.

BACKGROUND OF ICWA AND NOTABLE CASES

A. Native American Children Removal Prior to ICWA
1. The Early Era
Throughout the history of the United States, Native
American children have been removed from their homes for
the purposes of “education” and “civilization.”12 Beginning in
the Colonial Era, these children were used as a way of
controlling tribal behavior.13 As a part of warfare between
the colonists and the Native Americans, the colonists often
attacked tribes’ villages and “target[ed] children and their
food source.”14 Native American children were also captured
and used as hostages.15 During the Revolutionary War,
Native American boys were sent to Dartmouth, supposedly
to be educated but also to prevent their tribes from allying
10. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019).
11. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 33335 (5th Cir. Nov. 7,
2019).
12. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Wenona T. Singel, Indian Children and the
Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship, 95 NEB. L. REV. 885, 889 (2017); see also JOHN
GRENIER, THE FIRST WAY OF WAR: AMERICAN WAR MAKING ON THE FRONTIER, 1607–
1814 (2005).
13. Fletcher & Singel, supra note 12, at 895.
14. Id. at 896.
15. Id. at 895.
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with the British.16 Instead of “students,” these children were
referred to as “hostages.”17
After the American Revolution, Congress’ focus shifted
to “civilizing” the Native Americans.18 The first attempts to
accomplish this involved sending missionaries to various
tribes.19 As part of their attempts to convert Native
Americans to Christianity, missionaries and the religious
organizations that funded them “sought to replace tribal
culture, including Indian languages, with Christianity,
Euro-American civilization, and the language of Euro-

16. Id. at 911. For a further discussion of this event, see COLIN G. CALLOWAY,
THE INDIAN HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION: NATIVE AMERICANS AND
DARTMOUTH (2010). The head of Dartmouth, Eleazar Wheelock, asked Congress
to appoint $500 to the school for the education of Native American boys. See
MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, INDIAN ORPHANAGES 87 (2001). Wheelock credited the fact
that Dartmouth was never attacked during the Revolution to the presence of
these “hostages.” Calloway, supra note 16, at 40–41.
17. Fletcher & Singel, supra note 12, at 911; see also Calloway, supra note 16,
at 40–41.
18. See K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, THE UNNATURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
INDIAN EDUCATION, IN NEXT STEPS: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE TO ADVANCE
AMERICAN INDIAN EDUCATION 1, 1–6 (Karen Gayton Swisher & John W.
Tippeconnic III eds., 1999).
19. Letter from George Washington, President of the United States, to
Benjamin Lincoln, Cyrus Griffin, and David Humphreys, Esq’rs (Aug. 29, 1789),
reprinted in FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Washington/05-03-02-0326. On the topic of Native Americans, Washington wrote:
You will also endeavour [sic] to obtain a stipulation for certain
missionaries to reside in the nation provided the General Government
should think proper to adopt the measure—These Men to be precluded
from trade or attempting to purchase any lands but to have a certain
reasonable quantity pr [sic] head, allowed for the purpose of
cultivation—The object of this establishment would be the happiness of
the Indians, teaching them great duties of religion, and morality, and to
inculcate a friendship and attachment to the united [sic] States. If after
you have made your Communication to the Creeks and that you are
persuaded that you are fully understood by them, they should refuse to
treat and conclude a peace on the terms you propose, it may be concluded
that they are decided on a continuance of acts of Hostility and that they
ought to be gaurded [sic] against as the determined enemies of the
United States.
Id.
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American society.”20 Because children adapted more easily to
a new language, missionaries often focused on them,
believing them to be the path to “civilizing” the tribes.21
Missionaries taught Native American children to read and
write while teaching them Christianity, partly to convey
religious knowledge through the Bible and other religious
texts but also to promote “civilization.”22 Some missionaries
believed in using the Native Americans’ languages alongside
English for the purposes of religious instruction.23 However,
many “viewed [Native American languages] as barbarous
and inadequate mediums for conveying Christian doctrines
and as incompatible with efforts to foster the civilization of
the Indians.”24
2. Boarding Schools
During the 1800s, the United States sharpened its focus
on formal education as a means to “kill the Indian so as to
save the man within.”25 In 1819, Congress created the
“Civilization Fund” to provide money for schools to educate

20. Allison M. Dussias, Waging War with Words: Native Americans’
Continuing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 901, 909 (1999).
21. See id. at 905–06, 908.
22. See id. at 906–08.
23. Jon Reyhner, Indigenous and Minority Languages Under Siege: Finding
Answers to a Global Threat, 3 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 168 (2008)
(stating that “Some missionaries strongly objected to not using Indian languages
in their schools. Missionary societies engaged in foreign missions were very
conscious of the importance of using local languages in their work.”).
24. Dussias, supra note 20, at 908.
25. Col. Richard Pratt, quoted in DAVID H. DEJONG, PROMISES OF THE PAST: A
HISTORY OF INDIAN EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3–21 (1993). Pratt was the
founder and first superintendent of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School in
Pennsylvania, one of the oldest boarding schools created to educate and “civilize”
Native Americans. See generally RICHARD H. PRATT, THE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL
SCHOOL, CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA: ITS ORIGINS, PURPOSES, AND THE DIFFICULTIES
SURMOUNTED (1908); see also RICHARD H. PRATT, DRASTIC FACTS ABOUT OUR
INDIANS AND OUR INDIAN SYSTEM (1917); JACQUELINE FEAR-SEGAL & SUSAN D.
ROSE, CARLISLE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL: INDIGENOUS HISTORIES, MEMORIES,
AND RECLAMATIONS (2016).
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Native Americans.26 A compulsory attendance law was
passed in 1898; if parents refused to send their children to
school, the government “[withheld] rations, clothing, and
annuities.”27 Native children as young as four and five were
removed from their parents and sent to boarding schools,
where they were forbidden to speak their tribal languages
and forced to speak English.28 Those who promoted these
schools, most often religious groups,29 saw boarding schools
as ideal because they believed that, in order to “civilize”
Native children, they had to be taken away from the
influence of their families and tribes.30 This view dominated
Native education policy for the next seventy years.31 In 1928,
a team headed by Lewis Meriam published a report on the
conditions of Native Americans.32 This report was the result
of studies done throughout the 1920s.33 The authors stated
that although “the boarding school, either reservation or
non-reservation, is the dominant characteristic of the school
system maintained by the national government for its Indian
wards . . . provisions for the care of the Indian children in
boarding schools are grossly inadequate.”34 The report stated

26. GEORGE DEWEY HARMON, SIXTY YEARS OF INDIAN AFFAIRS: POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC, 1789–1850 161 (1941).
27. Tabatha Toney Booth, Cheaper Than Bullets: American Indian Boarding
Schools and Assimilation Policy, 1890–1930, available at https://web.archive.org/
web/20160404090314/http://www.se.edu/nas/files/2013/03/NAS-2009-proceeding
s-Booth.pdf.
28. See Raymond Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History
and the Nation’s Debt to the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941,
954 (1999).
29. Dussias, supra note 20, at 909.
30. Cross, supra note 28, at 952.
31. Id. at 960.
32. See generally LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION: REPORT OF A SURVEY MADE AT THE REQUEST OF HONORABLE
HUBERT WORK, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND SUBMITTED TO HIM, FEBRUARY 21,
1928 (1928), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED087573.pdf.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 11.
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that these children were fed a “deficient” diet35 that
contributed to the high occurrence of tuberculosis and
trachoma in boarding school students.36 The report
concluded that:
[t]he most fundamental need in Indian education is a change in
point of view. Whatever may have been the official governmental
attitude, education for the Indian in the past has proceeded largely
on the theory that it is necessary to remove the Indian child as far
as possible from his home environment; whereas the modern point
of view in education and social work lays stress on upbringing in
the natural setting of home and family life.37

After this point, enrollment in boarding schools declined,
although the Great Depression caused a temporary rise in
the number of new students due to many families’ economic
conditions.38
As the Meriam Report noted, boarding schools were often
abusive environments that caused the suffering and even
death of many students.39 This was true since their inception
and remained so both throughout their heyday and as their
popularity declined.40 Native American students suffered

35. Id.
36. Id. at 12. At the Carlisle School, approximately 500 students died from
disease throughout the school’s existence. PRESTON MCBRIDE, A BLUEPRINT FOR
DEATH IN U.S. OFF-RESERVATION BOARDING SCHOOLS: RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL
MORTALITIES AT CARLISLE INDIAN INDUSTRIAL SCHOOl, 1879–1918 195 (2013).
37. MERIAM ET AL., supra note 32, at 346.
38. Booth, supra note 27, at 48.
39. See generally BOARDING SCHOOL BLUES: REVISITING AMERICAN INDIAN
EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Clifford E. Trafzer et al. ed., 2006).
40. See Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit
Against the Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses,
4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 45, 67 (2006). Negiel Bigpond, who attended the
Chilocco Boarding School during the 1950s and 1960s, stated that:
We were put into solitary confinement and punished. I can remember
one night I had to defend myself from one of the counselors who was
trying to provoke me and start trouble so he could give me hours of work
duty or to make me stand all night in a corner or on top of a one-foot-byone-foot box with my nose to the wall. If we were caught sleeping, guards
would walk up behind us and bang our heads into the wall. I received
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both physical and sexual abuse.41 Many school employees
were pedophiles who used their positions to prey upon
vulnerable students without repercussions.42 Extreme
corporal punishment was common; teachers and other
disciplinarians beat students with whips, baseball bats, coat
hangers, and rubber hoses.43 Some students died as a result
of these beatings.44 Employees who abused students rarely
received any consequences for their actions.45
Students also suffered emotional and psychological
abuse at boarding schools.46 School employees were
instructed “not to comfort and counsel [them].”47 Students
were forced to speak only English and were punished for
speaking their native languages.48 Through this process,
many bloody noses and cuts on my forehead. We were also made to scrub
floors and walls with small hand brushes and even toothbrushes.
The emotional and mental abuse was very bad. We were made to feel
that we were nothing. We were called “dogs” and “stupid” and “Indian”
in an angry, degrading and mocking voice. There was sexual abuse as
well that I would rather not talk about. I choose not to go into the details
of all that happened there. When released and I returned home I would
cry a lot. I developed resentments toward my parents and turned against
authority. I could not trust authority. I could not adapt to public school.
Apology to Native Peoples: Hearing on S.J. Res. 15, Before S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 112th Cong. (2005) (statement of Negiel Bigpond, Sr., President, Two
Rivers Native American Training Center).
41. Curcio, supra note 40, at 67; see also Sarah Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex
Trafficking of Native Women in the United States, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 621,
666 (2010).
42. Curcio, supra note 40, at 67.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 69.
46. Id. at 72 (stating that “[a]ttendees’ symptoms often mirror those suffered
by concentration camp survivors or survivors of child abuse, domestic violence,
rape, and hostage situations”).
47. Curcio, supra note 40, at 70.
48. Dussias, supra note 20, at 926. One teacher stated that she “once had
thirty-five Mohave kindergartners lie ‘like little sardines’ across tables, and then
spanked them for speaking Mohave.” Id. (quoting DAVID WALLACE ADAMS,
EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL
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some children began to associate their native languages with
fear.49 In addition, children who adapted to speaking only
English found it difficult to communicate with their parents
and relatives once they returned home.50
Successive generations suffered the effects of their
ancestors’ boarding school upbringings.51 Being raised
outside a family environment in an oftentimes abusive
situation meant that parents lacked the examples to
properly raise their own children.52 Lynn Eagle Feather’s
great-great-grandfather was the first member of her family
to attend a boarding school; many of his descendants also
attended such schools.53 Lynn’s mother, who had also been
raised in a boarding school, dropped Lynn and her younger
sister off at the Saint Francis Mission School in North

EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 141 (1995)). One school that allowed dual instruction in
English and Dakota received the following directive:
[T]he English language only must be taught the Indian youth placed
there for educational and industrial training at the expense of the
Government. If Dakota or any other language is taught such children,
they will be taken away and their support by the Government will be
withdrawn from the school.
J.D.C. Atkins, The English Language in Indian Schools, in AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN,” 1880–1900 199
(Francis Paul Prucha, ed., 1973).
49. Dussias, supra note 20, at 928. At the Carlisle school, one student spoke
a word of her native Sioux and became “so upset that she could not eat her dinner
and wept at the dining table.” Id.
50. See id. One former student reported that he could barely form a full
sentence in his native Pawneean. Id.
51. Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing
Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L.
REV. 149, 158 (2007).
52. Id. at 159. Ida Amiotte, who had attended a boarding school, stated, “My
children always asked me ‘Why are you so cold? Why don’t you hug us?’ I said ‘I
never learned how.’” Id. at n.91.
53. Cecily Hilleary, Indian Boarding Schools: One Woman’s Tragic,
Triumphant Story, VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.voa
news.com/a/indian-boarding-schools-a-family-affair/4078971.html. Lynn’s greatgreat-grandfather, Felix Eagle Feather, was sent 1400 miles away from his tribal
home to the Carlisle School in Pennsylvania. Id.
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Dakota when Lynn was six years old.54 Her sister was five.55
Lynn states: “I was abused for years, most of my life. That’s
why I didn’t ever get married. I chose to be on my own. When
I did have children, I didn’t know how to raise them. I lost
my children to the Department of Human Services.”56
3. Adoption
Following the decline of boarding schools came a new
reason to remove Native American children from their
homes: adoption.57 The Indian Adoption Project lasted from
1959 to 1967 and was the product of cooperation between
three agencies.58 Two (the United States Children’s Bureau
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs) were federal agencies,
while the third was a “a federated agency known as the Child
Welfare League of America.”59 These agencies collaborated to
“remov[e] administrative and racial barriers”60 in order to
place Native American children into white adoptive
families.61 Newspaper articles and television spots labeled
54. Id.
55. Id. Lynn’s son, Paul Castaway, was shot by the police in Denver, Colorado,
in 2015. Id. Lynn had called the police when Paul, whom she had a protective
order against, entered her apartment and threatened her with a knife. Noelle
Phillips, Denver DA Will Not Charge Officer Who Shot, Killed Paul Castaway,
DENVER POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/09/14/denverda-will-not-charge-officer-who-shot-killed-paul-castaway/. No charges were filed
against the police officer. Id.
56. Hilleary, supra note 53.
57. Claire Palmiste, From the Indian Adoption Project to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: the Resistance of Native American Communities, 12 INDIGENOUS
POL’Y J., no.1, at 1 (2011); see also Gabby Deutch, A Court Battle Over a Dallas
Toddler Could Decide the Future of Native American Law, ATLANTIC (Feb. 21,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2019/02/indian-child-welfareacts-uncertain-future/582628/.
58. Palmiste, supra note 57, at 1.
59. Id. The Child Welfare League of America’s main role in the partnership
was to “remov[e] legal barriers for interstate adoptions [and] solv[e] conflicts in
adoption laws and practices.” Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. In the preceding decades, adoption agencies had focused on creating
“cultural, religious and physical match[es]” between potential adoptive families
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Native American babies as “God forgotten [c]hildren” who
were doomed to languish in neglect on reservations unless
white couples stepped up and adopted them.62
During the project’s eight-year span, approximately 400
Native American children were adopted by white families.63
During the 1960s, other agencies took on a similar emphasis
on Native American adoption, resulting in white couples
adopting over 12,000 Native American children by the mid1970s.64 Follow-up studies on these children revealed that,
although they usually did well during infancy and early
childhood, “once they [reached] adolescence, runaway
problems, suicide attempts, drug usage, and truancy [were]
extremely common among them, even though they [were]
raised away from the reservation and away from Indian
society . . . during adolescence, [the teenagers] found that
society was not to grant them the white identity that they
had.”65
B. Creation of ICWA
The Indian Child Welfare Act was the result of a
Congressional investigation that took place over four years.66
This investigation revealed that between 25 to 35% of Native
American children were removed from their families and
and babies. Id. at 1 n.1. However, during the 1950s, the number of white babies
available for adoption declined due to “wide use of contraceptive materials
amongst white women, the possibility of abortion in some states, and a fading
stigma towards unwed mothers.” Id. at 2. Thus, with white families being the
majority of couples seeking adoption, agencies began to abandon their previous
“matching” tactics and promote interracial adoption. See id. at 2–3. The first
widely publicized transracial adoptions of the 1950s were international adoptions
from Korea. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 2–3.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id. at 5–6.
65. Id. at 6 (quoting Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, a “psychiatrist who worked
with Native patients”).
66. Kasey D. Ogle, Why Try to Change Me Now?: The Basis for the 2016 Indian
Child Welfare Act Regulations, 96 NEB. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (2017).
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placed in foster care or institutions such as orphanages and
the remaining boarding schools.67 Oftentimes, the only
rationalization behind these removals was that these
children would be better off in a home with white parents of
a higher socioeconomic status.68 In order to address this
“cultural genocide,”69 Congress passed ICWA in 1978.70 This
Act gave jurisdiction of all custody proceedings involving
“Indian children” to tribal courts.71 ICWA defined “Indian
child” as a child who is either a member of a federally
recognized tribe or eligible to be a member of such a tribe and
have a biological parent who is a tribal member.72 Native
American parents were no longer required to send their
children to boarding school and required that investigations
begin to determine the “feasibility” of establishing “locally
convenient day schools” on reservations.73 ICWA also
required that involuntary termination of Native American
parents’ rights be based on evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt74 as opposed to the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard traditionally used in such proceedings.75 ICWA
further stated that:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a
preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended

67. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 1.
68. Id.; see also infra Section III.B.
69. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 2; see also Andrea Wilkins, State-Tribal
Cooperation and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 1 (July 2008), https://
www.ncsl.org/print/statetribe/ICWABrief08.pdf.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
71. Id. at § 1911.
72. Id. at § 1903(4).
73. Id. at § 1961.
74. Id. at § 1912.
75. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-314, WIS. STAT. § 48.415 (2017–2018).
In contrast to beyond a reasonable doubt, preponderance of the evidence is often
defined as “more probable than not.” See Charlene Sabini, Burden of Proof: An
Essay of Definition, NALS (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.nals.org/blogpost/
1359892/300369/Burden-of-Proof-An-Essay-of-Definition.
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family; (2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other
Indian families.76

C. Post-ICWA
The first Supreme Court case regarding ICWA,
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, was
decided in 1989.77 In Holyfield, two Native parents domiciled
on a Choctaw reservation made an adoption plan for their
unborn twins.78 Before giving birth, the mother moved off the
reservation.79 The twins were placed with a white couple and
later adopted.80 The Supreme Court held that the twins were
under the jurisdiction of ICWA because both of their parents
were domiciled on the Choctaw reservation, regardless of
where the twins were actually born.81 Once the case was
removed to the tribal court, that court allowed the twins to
remain with the Holyfields for adoption, stating that
removing them after nearly five years would be “cruel.”82
Similar concerns of “cultural genocide” were raised about
a different race of children around the same time Congress
passed ICWA. During the 1960s, white families began
adopting increasing numbers of black children.83 The
National Association of Black Social Workers expressed
doubt that white parents could adequately parent black
children in a culturally competent way.84 However, other

76. 25 U.S.C. § 1915.
77. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
78. Id. at 37.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 30, 38.
81. Id. at 48–49.
82. Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1,
17 (2008).
83. Id. at 33. See also supra note 61 and accompanying text.
84. National Association of Black Social Workers, Position Statement on
Trans-Racial Adoption (1972), https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/archive/
NabswTRA.htm.
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child welfare organizations raised concerns about the large
number of black children remaining in foster care for years
awaiting adoptive families.85
In response to this, Congress passed the Multiethnic
Placement Act (MEPA) in 1994 and amended it in 1996.86
MEPA applied to all agencies that placed children into
adoptive homes and received federal funding.87 The original
Act allowed adoption agencies to weigh race and culture as
factors when determining the placement of a child.88
However, some agencies continued to use race as the most
important factor when placing children for adoption instead
of as just one factor to be considered. As a response to this,
the 1996 amendments to the MEPA removed these
considerations and prohibited race-based placements.89
However, the amended MEPA allowed for an exception to
conform with ICWA, stating that agencies:
[may not] delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into
foster care, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the
adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved . . . This subsection
shall not be construed to affect the application of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978.90

The most recent wave of court cases dealing with ICWA

85. Id. Black children, along with Native American children, were considered
“hard to place” along with children who were “developmentally delayed and
physically disabled.” Fostering and Foster Care, THE ADOPTION HISTORY PROJECT
(last updated Feb. 24, 2012), https://pages.uoregon.edu/adoption/topics/fostering
.htm.
86. Maldonado, supra note 82, at 33–34.
87. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5115(a) (repealed 1996).
89. Id.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1996(b). MEPA was passed partially in reaction to groups that
lobbied for legislation similar to ICWA that would apply to black children. See
Douglas R. Esten, Transracial Adoption and the Multiethnic Placement Act of
1994, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1941, 1948–49 (1995). Support for such a law still exists.
See generally Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal
Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases,
10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109 (2008).

2020]

BENEFIT OR BURDEN?

261

can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl (also known as the Baby
Veronica case).91 In this case, an unmarried father, Dusten
Brown, agreed to give up his parental rights and proceeded
to place the child with a white couple, Matt and Melanie
Capobianco, for the purpose of adoption.92 Because Christina
Maldanado, the child’s mother, identified the baby’s father
as being part Cherokee, her lawyer notified the tribe of the
pending adoption, although Brown’s first name and date of
birth were incorrect.93 The Capobiancos supported
Maldanado for the remainder of her pregnancy; Brown did
not provide assistance to Maldanado since she refused to
marry him after discovering that she was pregnant.94 Brown
also signed a document giving up his parental rights four
months after the child’s birth, although he stated during
later testimony that he was not aware he was doing so for
the purposes of adoption.95 Shortly afterwards, Brown
requested a stay of the adoption.96 After two years of legal
proceedings, the child (“Baby Veronica”) was placed into
Brown’s custody by the South Carolina Supreme Court. 97
The court held that Baby Veronica was subject to ICWA due
to her father being an enrolled member of the Cherokee
Nation.98 Therefore, in order to terminate Brown’s rights, the
Capobiancos would have had to show that “custody of
[Veronica] would result in serious emotional or physical
harm to her beyond a reasonable doubt.”99 Because they

91. Jane Burke, The “Baby Veronica” Case: Current Implementation Problems
of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 307, 307 (2014).
92. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 643 (2013).
93. Id. at 643–44.
94. Id. at 644.
95. Id. at 644–45.
96. Id. at 645.
97. Id. at 645.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 646.
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failed to do so, Brown received custody of the child.100 The
Capobiancos appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.101
The majority held that, because Brown had never been a
custodial parent, ICWA did not apply, as this statute had
been intended to protect the “continued custody” of Native
American parents.102 Because of this holding, the
Capobiancos were able to adopt Veronica, as under the
applicable state statutes Brown’s parental rights could be
involuntarily terminated for not providing support to
Maldanado during her pregnancy.103 In its decision, the
majority stated that a reading of ICWA that allowed an
absentee father to “play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh
hour”104 and prevent the mother from giving the child up for
adoption would raise equal protection concerns, as this would
cause many hopeful adoptive parents to hesitate to accept
placements of children who had remote Native heritage.105
The majority also held that ICWA’s placement preferences
did not apply when “no alternative party has formally sought
to adopt the child.”106
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated that, contrary
to what the majority claimed, classifying a case as ICWAapplicable based on blood descent does not raise equal
protection concerns.107 Rather, the Supreme Court had
previously held that such a classification was political as
opposed to “impermissibl[y] racial.”108 Therefore, Sotomayor
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 653–54.
103. Id. at 646–47.
104. Id. at 656.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 655. No paternal relatives of Veronica’s, nor any member of the
Cherokee tribe, had filed a petition to adopt her. Id. at 655–56.
107. Id. at 690.
108. Id.
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stated that the majority’s “hint[ing] at lurking constitutional
problems [that are] irrelevant” only “[created] a lingering
mood of disapprobation of the criteria for [tribal]
membership.”109
After the decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, later
cases seized upon the equal protection language in that case
and filed suit on these constitutional grounds. Many of these
cases were filed by the Goldwater Institute, a nonprofit
group.110 One of the Goldwater Institute’s stated missions is
to “ensur[e] equal protection for Native American children”
by “challenging the Indian Child Welfare Act.”111
Courts have dismissed many of these recent cases
challenging ICWA for lack of standing.112 In one such case,
National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, the court denied the
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.113 The court held
that the plaintiff, an adoption agency, failed to show “a
cognizable injury in fact” and a “causal connection” between
such an injury and ICWA.114
Another case, A.D. v. Washburn, challenged ICWA by
alleging
that
it
was
“unconstitutional
racial
115
discrimination.” The plaintiffs, several foster parents and
adoptive couples and their respective foster and adoptive

109. Id. at 691.
110. See Ensuring Equal Protection for Native American Children, GOLDWATER
INSTITUTE, https://goldwaterinstitute.org/indian-child-welfare-act/ (last visited
Nov. 16, 2019).
111. Id.
112. Scott Trowbridge, Legal Challenges to ICWA: An Analysis of Current Case
Law, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/child_law_practice/vol-36/
january-2017/legal-challenges-to-icwa—an-analysis-of-current-case-law/.
113. 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 738 (E.D. Va. 2015). The plaintiff, National Council
for Adoption, Building Arizona Families, filed suit on behalf of itself and its
clients, birthparents who sought to give up their infant “T.W.” for adoption.
114. Id. at 735.
115. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060 at *4 (D. Ariz., Mar. 16, 2017).
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children,116 argued that portions of ICWA violated both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution.117 The court held that, as in National Adoption
Council v. Jewell, the plaintiffs lacked standing because they
failed to show the existence of an injury and a causal
connection between that injury and ICWA.118
Despite the fact that the continued constitutional
challenges to ICWA were not successful, some jurisdictions
failed to adhere to it. In 2015, the Oglala and Rosebud Sioux
tribes brought a suit against several individuals in the child
welfare field alleging that they violated ICWA when
removing Native American children from their homes
“during state court 48-hour hearings.” 119 The defendants
included the Honorable Jeff Davis, the presiding judge of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit in South Dakota; Mark Vargo, the
State’s Attorney of Pennington County, South Dakota; Lynne
Valenti, the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of
Social Services; and LuAnn Van Hunnik, who was in charge
of Pennington County’s Child Protection Services.120
The South Dakota district court found that the
defendants had violated both ICWA121 and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 ICWA requires
that anyone seeking to place a Native American child into
foster care must show “that active efforts have been. [sic]
made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs . . . and that these efforts have proved
unsuccessful.”123 If such a showing is not made, the person
116. Id. at *9.
117. Id. at *10.
118. Id. at *33–34.
119. Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 755–56 (D.S.D.
2015).
120. Id. at 753.
121. Id. at 769.
122. Id. at 772.
123. Id. at 755 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)).
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seeking foster care placement must show by “clear and
convincing evidence, including testimony of qualified expert
witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child.”124 The court
found that the defendants had not followed either provision
at hearings which took place forty-eight hours after a child’s
temporary placement into foster care.125 In addition, Judge
Davis did not allow Native American parents to present
evidence at these hearings126 and the defendants as a whole
often did not inform parents why their children were placed
into foster care.127
In 2016, in response to states’ lenient adherence to
ICWA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs released new ICWA
guidelines.128 These guidelines clarified key portions of
ICWA, such as the definitions of “Indian child” and “extended
family.”129 The most significant change was the guidelines’
explanation of the “good cause” clause of ICWA. From 1978
to 2016, it had been left to the courts in each individual case
to decide what “good cause” meant.130 The “Final Rule”
placed the burden of proof on the non-Native party seeking
to adopt.131 It also stated that courts should not compare the
financial situations of Native and non-Native families.132
This led to the case that is the subject of this Note.

124. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)).
125. Id. at 765.
126. Id. at 764.
127. Id. at 758.
128. 25 CFR § 23.2 (2019).
129. Id.
130. Flynn, supra note 2.
131. 25 C.F.R. § 23.132(b) (2019).
132. Flynn, supra note 2.
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II. BRACKEEN V. ZINKE
The case involved seven individual plaintiffs: Chad and
Jennifer Brackeen, Nick and Heather Libretti, Altagracia
Socorro Hernandez, and Jason and Danielle Clifford.133
Three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana) also joined the
case.134 A.L.M., the child, was placed with the Brackeens as
a foster care placement at the age of ten months.135 His
parents were both enrolled members of Native tribes (Navajo
and Cherokee).136 After sixteen months, the Brackeens, with
the approval of A.L.M.’s parents, began the process of
adopting him137 after the state of Texas terminated the
biological parents’ rights.138 The Navajo Nation found a
potential adoptive placement in New Mexico that was not
biologically related to A.L.M.139 The Brackeens argued that
there was good cause for A.L.M. to remain in their home and
be adopted by them, as he had lived with them for over a year
and was not acquainted with the prospective adoptive
resource in New Mexico.140 They further contended that by
moving out of Texas, A.L.M. would lose contact with his
biological family, including his parents and grandmother. 141
Under the Final Rule, evidence of good cause must be “clear
and convincing” and the non-Native party seeking adoption
bears the burden of proof.142 The Texas Department of
Family Services stated that the Brackeens had not met this

133. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 519 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev’d sub
nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 525.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 526.
142. Id.

2020]

BENEFIT OR BURDEN?

267

burden of proof.143 Despite this, the Brackeens were allowed
to petition the court for adoption of A.L.M. in January of
2018; however, they stated that they wished to foster and
adopt more children in the future, but will now hesitate to
consider children of Native American descent.144
Altagracia Socorro Hernandez placed her child, “Baby
O.,” with the Librettis for the purpose of adoption.145
Although the baby’s father is descended from members of the
Pueblo Tribe, he is not himself a member.146 The Pueblo
Tribe intervened in the custody proceedings regarding Baby
O. and attempted to move her to a different placement.147
Once the Librettis joined the instant case, the Pueblo Tribe
allowed them to petition for Baby O.’s adoption; however, like
the Brackeens, the Librettis state that they too wish to adopt
children in the future and will be cautious about pursuing
the adoption of any Native American child.148
“Child P.” was placed with the Cliffords as a foster
placement.149 While Child P. is not a registered member of a
Native tribe, her grandmother is a member of the White
Earth Ojibwe band.150 As a result of the placement
preferences outlined in ICWA, Child P. was removed from
the Cliffords’ home and placed with her grandmother, who
had previously lost her license to provide foster care.151
In a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs argued
that ICWA violates both the Equal Protection and Due

143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 526–27.
149. Id. at 527.
150. See id.
151. Id.
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Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment,152 the Tenth
Amendment,153 and the “proper scope” of the Indian
Commerce Clause.154 Additionally, the state plaintiffs
argued that ICWA “usurps” state authority over child
custody and welfare proceedings and also burdens state
governments with the cost of complying with ICWA.155
The defendants consisted of the Cherokee, Navajo, and
Oneida Nations, as well as the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior and the Director of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs.156 They contended that prior Supreme Court
decisions had determined that classification based on Native
American ancestry was political, not racial, and thus ICWA
should not be subject to strict scrutiny.157
The Texas district court granted summary judgment on
the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.158 In its holding, the
court found that the classifications made by ICWA were
based on race, as ICWA applies not only to children who are
members of a federally recognized tribe, but children who are
eligible for such membership.159 Thus, the court held that
ICWA was subject to strict scrutiny.160 Once the court
applied this standard, it found that ICWA failed to survive
152. Id. at 530.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 529–30.
156. Id. at 519–20.
157. Id. at 531.
158. Id. at 536. See generally Timothy Sandefur, Escaping the ICWA Penalty
Box: In Defense of Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS.
J. 1, 24 (2017) (noting the plaintiffs in Brackeen were not the first to challenge
the ICWA on equal protection grounds. Proponents of this view argued that
ICWA deprived Native American children of equal protection because “in an
ICWA case, the most crucial factor—virtually the deciding factor—is the child’s
biologically determined Indian status . . . because [this] result[s] in treating them
differently than other children due exclusively to their racial or national origin,
[ICWA] also deprive[s] Indian children of the equal protection of the law”).
159. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 534–35.
160. Id. at 534.
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strict scrutiny because it was not “narrowly tailored to a
compelling [governmental] interest.”161 The court stated that
ICWA was “overinclusive”162 because this Act “establishes
standards that are unrelated to specific tribal interests and
applies those standards to potential Indian children,”
thereby affecting not only children who were tribal members,
but those who could possibly enroll.163
The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment on their claims that ICWA violates the
Tenth Amendment.164 In doing so, the court relied heavily on
the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. NCAA, in
which the Court held that “[the Constitution] confers upon
Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”165
The Texas court stated that ICWA “requires states to adopt
and administer comprehensive federal standards in state
created causes of action” and thus regulates those states.166
Furthermore, because of this, the court found that ICWA
extended beyond the scope of the Indian Commerce Clause
and thus granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on that ground. 167
The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment on their due process claim, stating that the
Supreme Court had never “applied [due process] rights in a
situation involving either prospective adoptive parents or
adoptive parents whose adoption is open to collateral
attack.”168 The defendants appealed the Texas court’s

161. Id. at 535.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 541.
165. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (quoting New York v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992)).
166. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 541.
167. Id. at 546.
168. Id.
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decision to the Fifth Circuit.169 In December of 2018, the
Fifth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal.170
The Fifth Circuit issued a decision on August 9, 2019.171
The appellate court held that the district court had erred in
its ruling and that ICWA did not violate the Constitution.
The court determined that ICWA was “based on a political
classification that is rationally related to the fulfillment of
Congress’s unique obligation toward Indians.”172 The Fifth
Circuit panel also held that “ICWA preempts conflicting
state laws” and “does not violate the Tenth Amendment
anticommandeering doctrine.”173 On November 7, 2019, the
Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc.174
III. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
A. Analysis of Brackeen Decision
The court in Brackeen came to an erroneous decision
when it determined that ICWA’s placement preferences
violated the Equal Protection Clause, and the Fifth Circuit
should come to the same conclusion in its rehearing en banc
as it did in its panel decision. Had the district court applied
the correct standard of judicial review, rational basis review,
instead of strict scrutiny, it could not have arrived at the
same conclusion. Courts apply strict scrutiny “when the
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications.”175 In its decision, the
169. Notice of Appeal, Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (2018) (No. 1811479).
170. Brackeen v. Cherokee Nation, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 36903, at *6 (5th
Cir. Dec. 3, 2018) (No. 18-11479).
171. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d. 406, 406 (5th Cir. 2019).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 33335 (5th Cir. Nov. 7,
2019).
175. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007).
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Brackeen court distinguished between laws targeting Native
Americans by “racial classifications”176 as opposed to those
that create “political classifications” and found that ICWA
made the former type.177 To illustrate this difference, the
court contrasted the holding of the Supreme Court in Rice v.
Cayetano with that in Morton v. Mancari.178
At issue in Rice v. Cayetano was a Hawaii statute
limiting what persons could vote in an election for trustees
of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA).179 This office
oversaw programs which were designed to benefit
“Hawaiians.”180 Hawaiians, as defined by the statute at
issue, were not the general inhabitants of that state but
rather “those persons who are descendants of people
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778.”181 Only those who
qualified as Hawaiian under this definition could vote in the
election for the OHA trustee positions.182 The State argued
that the statute was not racially based but rather created
classifications based on “whose ancestors were in Hawaii at
a particular time, regardless of their race.”183 The Court did
not find the State’s argument persuasive, stating that the
statute in question “used ancestry as a racial definition and
for a racial purpose,”184 and that an “ancestral inquiry” was
“not consistent with respect . . . the Constitution itself
secures in its concern for persons and citizens.”185 The Court
176. Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. 528 U.S. 495, 498–99 (2000).
180. Id. at 499.
181. Id. This category was further subdivided into “Hawaiians,” as defined
above, and “native Hawaiians,” who were at least 50% descended from
“descendants of people inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778.” Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 514.
184. Id. at 515.
185. Id. at 517.
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held that the “demeaning premise that citizens of a
particular race are somehow more qualified than others to
vote on certain matters . . . attacks the central meaning of
the Fifteenth Amendment.”186
In contrast, in Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court
held that a hiring preference for Native Americans was a
political classification and therefore permissible.187 At issue
in Mancari was a portion of the Indian Reorganization Act
that gave Native Americans hiring preferences for positions
at the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).188 Non-Native
employees argued that this preference was impermissible
because it denied them “equal employment opportunity.”189
In holding that the classification was political as opposed to
racial, the Court pointed to a long series of cases throughout
the United States’ history that “single[d] out Indians for
particular and special treatment.”190 The Court stated this
“special treatment” was allowable so long as it was rationally
related to the “fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation
towards the Indians.”191
Here, the classification made by ICWA is like that in
Mancari rather than Rice. ICWA applies to children who are
members of a federally recognized tribe, as well as those
eligible for such membership who have at least one parent

186. Id. at 523.
187. 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974). The Court stated that “the preference is not
directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to
members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes. This operates to exclude many
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the
preference is political rather than racial in nature.” Id. at 553 n.24.
188. Id. at 537.
189. Id. at 539. The district court found that BIA’s hiring preferences were
“implicitly repealed by § 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.”
Id. at 540.
190. Id. at 554–55. The specific cases cited by the Court were Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966);
and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
191. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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that is already a member.192 Under Mancari, if a statute
creates a classification based on membership in a federally
recognized tribe, this classification is political, not racial.193
Therefore, ICWA’s first classification is clearly permissible.
ICWA’s second classification that depends on eligibility and
parentage is not an objectionable “ancestral inquiry” such as
in Rice.194 Rather, its purpose is to extend the political
classification to Native American children who would most
benefit from it. Membership in a federally recognized tribe is
“not conferred automatically upon birth . . . Instead, an
eligible child [or parents] must take affirmative steps to
enroll the child.”195 If ICWA did not include this second
classification, many children whose parents did not yet have
the opportunity to register them as tribal members would
lose the statute’s protections.196 Furthermore, other statutes
make political classifications based on parentage. For
example, children born abroad of U.S. citizens inherit their
parents’ citizenship.197 Therefore, the Brackeen court
incorrectly applied strict scrutiny.
When applying rational basis review, there is no
question that ICWA’s placement preferences are rationally
related to Congress’ “unique obligation” toward Native
Americans.198 Native American children have a long history
of being forcibly removed from their homes, families, and
culture.199 ICWA was designed to prevent these children
from being needlessly removed from their homes. Should
removal be necessary, ICWA greatly increases the chances

192. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2019).
193. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
194. Rice, 528 U.S. at 517.
195. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 31, Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d
514 (2018) (No. 18-11479).
196. Id. at 31.
197. Id. at 32 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1433).
198. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
199. See supra Part I.
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that these children are placed within their culture in order
to maintain it.200
B. Impact
For these reasons, this author believes that the Fifth
Circuit will issue the same ruling on rehearing en banc as it
did in its panel decision. However, there is a possibility,
however remote, that the Fifth Circuit en banc will instead
affirm the lower court. Such a decision would have multiple
negative effects. Although the decision would only be binding
on the Fifth Circuit, it would create a persuasive precedent
for other circuits to follow.
The most obvious consequence of the appellate court
affirming the ruling in Brackeen is the effect on adoption. If
ICWA is declared unconstitutional, the termination of the
parental rights (TPR) of Native Americans would be based
on a preponderance evidentiary standard as opposed to
beyond a reasonable doubt. This lowering of the evidentiary
standard would make it easier for child welfare workers who
are unfamiliar with Native culture to argue that parental
rights should be terminated. Officially, poverty alone is not
permitted to provide the basis for TPR; however, in practice,
it often does.201 This would put Native American parents at
an even greater risk of losing their parental rights; Native
Americans experience poverty at nearly twice the national
average.202 This would also put relatives seeking placement
of a child at risk. Non-ICWA child welfare proceedings are

200. See supra Section I.B.
201. See Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Parents, Judging Place: Poverty,
Rurality, and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L. REV. 95, 112–22 (2012)
(discussing the effects that poverty and rurality has on the termination of
parental rights).
202. American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2017,
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.census.gov/content/
dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/cb17-ff20.pdf. (stating that while
the national average of U.S. residents living below the poverty line was 14%,
amongst Native Americans this number was 26.2%).
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guided by the “best interest of the child.”203 This would
increase the risk of Native American children being placed
with white couples of a higher socioeconomic class instead of
relatives who could provide a vital link to their culture but
who fall into a lower income bracket.
The plaintiffs in a recent Texas case, In the Interest of
A.M., relied upon the holding in Brackeen to argue this
changed evidentiary standard.204 In A.M., the biological
mother of a three-year-old boy appealed the termination of
her parental rights, alleging ICWA violations.205 Because
A.M. met the definition of an “Indian child,” ICWA
applied.206 The Department of Social Services argued that
the holding in Brackeen “render[ed] [the mother’s]
complaints moot.”207 However, the court stated that
Brackeen could still be appealed and that the Supreme Court
had “upheld” ICWA in Holyfield; therefore, it addressed the
case on its merits.208
The placement preferences of ICWA would no longer
apply, raising concerns that the “culture genocide”
mentioned in the 1978 Congressional hearings would make
a resurgence.209 Disproportionate numbers of Native
American children are currently in foster care despite
ICWA’s more stringent requirements for removal.210 This

203. See, e.g., In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 548 (Tex. 2003) (“The State’s
fundamental interest in parental-rights termination cases is to protect the best
interest of the child.”); In re Michael B., 80 N.Y.2d 299, 312 (1992) (“The key
element in the court’s disposition is the best interest of the child.”).
204. In re A.M., 570 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).
205. Id. at 861, 863.
206. Id. at 863.
207. Id.
208. See id. Brackeen was indeed appealed. See supra note 169.
209. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 2.
210. See, e.g., Disproportionality Table, NATIONAL INDIAN CHILD WELFARE
ASSOCIATION, https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Disproportion
ality-Table.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2019). Native American children as a whole
are represented in foster care at approximately two-and-a-half times their
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disproportionality would only increase if child welfare
workers could adhere to a lower standard when removing
children. With ICWA no longer good law, MEPA would apply
instead. Native American children would be placed into
foster and adoptive homes with no consideration given to
their race or culture. Because the majority of adoptive
parents are white, most of these children would be placed
into white homes.211 This harkens back to boarding schools
and the Indian Adoption Project, harms that ICWA sought
to remedy.
However, the effects would most likely extend beyond
adoption cases. If the Fifth Circuit upholds that classification
based on Native American descent is an impermissible racial
classification, this will pave the way for other laws that use
this classification to be declared unconstitutional as well
using strict scrutiny. Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in
Morton v. Mancari that this classification is political rather
than racial,212 considering the reasoning of the majority in
Adoptive Couple, the possibility certainly exists that
Mancari will be overturned, or that enough exceptions will
be created that it is overturned in all but name. Based on the
number of cases immediately following Adoptive Couple that
seized on the opening left by the Supreme Court and
attempted to widen it, as well as how quickly the plaintiff’s

representation in the general population. Id. As a comparison, white children are
underrepresented in foster care. Id.; see also Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters,
Incentives And Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NPR (Oct. 25, 2011),
https://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuelfoster-system (“In South Dakota, Native American children make up only 15
percent of the child population, yet they make up more than half the children in
foster care.”); Katie Hickey & Liz June, Native American Disproportionality in
the Foster Care System, https://newscenter.sdsu.edu/education/csp/files/04541FY_Disproportionality_Native_Amer.pdf.
211. Adoption USA: A Chartbook Based on the 2007 National Survey of
Adoptive Parents. Race, Ethnicity, and Gender, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (Nov. 1, 2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/adoption-usa-chartbook-based2007-national-survey-adoptive-parents/race-ethnicity-and-gender (noting
around 73% of adoptive parents are white).
212. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974).
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arguments in A.M. relied on the holding in Brackeen, attacks
on Mancari would likely come sooner rather than later.
If this occurs, all federal statutes involving Native
Americans could potentially be at risk.213 The “political
classification” doctrine established in Mancari served as the
basis for courts to defend “a broad array of legislation
benefiting Indians and tribes against challenges by nonIndians.”214 Such legislation includes tax exemptions for
Native Americans that live on reservations,215 fishing
rights,216 the ability of the federal government to take land
into trust for Native American tribes,217 exclusive coal,
mineral, and timber rights on reservations,218 and federal
criminal jurisdiction over reservations.219
Brackeen is a “prime candidate”220 to come before the
Supreme Court. The recent appointment of Justice Brett
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court has heightened many
ICWA advocates’ concerns that ICWA will be overturned.221
213. Delia Sharpe & Jedd Parr, The Indian Child Welfare Act is Under Attack
Yet Again—And This Time Far More is at Stake, CALIFORNIA INDIAN LEGAL SERVS.
(Oct. 12, 2018), http://www.calindian.org/the-indian-child-welfare-act-is-underattack-yet-again-and-this-time-far-more-is-at-stake/ (stating that “Indian Health
Services and similar programs could disappear. Tribal lands, owned by the
federal government and held in trust for tribes, could be sold off or opened to oil,
gas, or minerals extraction . . . [e]ven tribes’ status as sovereign entities is
potentially at risk.”).
214. Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as
Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 993 (2011).
215. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,
425 U.S. 463, 463 (1976).
216. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assoc., 443 U.S. 658, 673 (1979).
217. Cent. N.Y. Fair Bus. Ass’n v. Salazar, No. 6:08-CV-660, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17772 at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010).
218. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 656–57 (1976).
219. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977).
220. Jefferson Keel et al., Protecting ICWA After Brackeen v. Zinke, NATIONAL
CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS (Oct. 21, 2018), http://www.ncai.org/resources/
resolutions/protecting-icwa-after-brackeen-v-zinke.
221. Daniel Perle, ‘Lack of Understanding of Tribes’: Brett Kavanaugh Deemed

278

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Kavanaugh replaced Justice Anthony Kennedy, a “key vote
on important tribal issues.”222 Native American attorneys
and leaders have accused Kavanaugh of not understanding
why statutes regarding Native Americans exist.223 Prior to
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Kavanaugh wrote an
op-ed in support of the decision in Rice v. Cayetano, calling
it, “one more step along the way in what I see as an inevitable
conclusion within the next 10 to 20 years when the court says
we are all one race in the eyes of government.”224 Concerned
Native Americans fear that Kavanaugh’s “willing[ness] to
split hairs regarding the rights and interests of Indigenous
groups” based on whether or not those groups are
“technically a federal Indian tribe does not bode well for how
he would treat other Indigenous groups of people in this
country.”225
Unfriendly to Indian Country, INDIANZ (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/
News/2018/09/19/lack-of-understanding-of-tribes-brett-ka.asp (stating that
“Tribal and legal officials . . . said his writings as a lawyer and his rulings in
environmental and voting rights cases give them pause.”). Kavanaugh was sworn
in as a Supreme Court Justice on October 6, 2018. Clare Foran & Stephen
Collinson, Brett Kavanaugh Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice, CNN (Oct. 6,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/06/politics/kavanaugh-final-confirmation-vo
te/index.html.
222. Cecily Hilleary, Native Americans Worry Trump Supreme Court Pick
Threatens Sovereignty, VOA NEWS (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/
native-american-tribes-worry-trump-supreme-court-pick-poses-threat-to-soverei
gnty/4561888.html.
223. See Perle, supra note 221 (quoting an attorney who stated, “[Kavanaugh]
fails to recognize what’s been done to put them (Native Americans) at a historical
disadvantage”); see also Nancy LeTourneau, Brett Kavanaugh Poses a Threat to
Native American Sovereignty, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Sept. 11, 2018), https://
washingtonmonthly.com/2018/09/11/brett-kavanaugh-poses-a-threat-to-nativeamerican-tribal-sovereignty/ (quoting Richard Peterson, president of the Central
Council of Tlingit & Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, who wrote that all 30,000
citizens of those tribes “would be endangered by Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation
because of his errorenous [sic] views on indigenous rights and tribal
sovereignty.”).
224. Anna V. Smith, Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s Impact on Indian Country,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairsjustice-brett-kavanaughs-impact-on-indian-country.
225. Id. (quoting Dylan Hedden-Nicely, director of Native American Law at the
University of Idaho); see also Press Release, Tom Udall, Kavanaugh’s
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IV. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ICWA as an attempt to prevent a
continuance of the harms done to Native American children
throughout the history of this country. An astounding
number of Native American children lived in out-of-home
placements before Congress passed ICWA. Native American
children are overrepresented in foster care even with ICWA’s
protection. If the Fifth Circuit en banc affirms the lower
court’s decision that ICWA is unconstitutional, there is a
genuine risk that these numbers will return to pre-ICWA
levels. The only method that the court in Brackeen could
have used to arrive at this result was to apply the wrong
standard of review. Had it applied the correct standard, it
would have been impossible for that court to reach the same
result. The Fifth Circuit en banc will mostly likely apply the
correct standard of review and issue the same holding as in
its panel decision. If the court en banc instead affirms the
district court’s decision, or if the case is granted certiorari by
the Supreme Court and the decision is affirmed there, this
country runs the risk of returning to the “cultural genocide”
of the past.226 As the director of the Navajo Office of Resource
Security stated during the ICWA confirmation hearings:
Confirmation Hearings Reveal Deeply Troubling Views on Indian Law and Policy,
DEMOCRATIC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.indian.senate.gov/news/pressrelease/udall-kavanaugh-s-confirmation-hearings-reveal-deeply-troubling-views
-indian-law. Senator Udall wrote that:
From the documents I have reviewed so far, and based on information
revealed during the hearings, I am convinced that Judge Kavanaugh is
no friend to Indian Country. He openly characterized federal protections
for Native Hawaiians as unconstitutional, and argued that “any racial
group with creative reasoning can qualify as an Indian tribe.” He even
questioned the constitutionality of programs dedicated specifically to
Native Americans, a view that could upend decades of progress for
Indian Country on everything from housing to government contracting.
And considering the sheer number of documents that are still being
shielded from public and Senate view, we may have only seen the tip of
the iceberg when it comes to Judge Kavanaugh’s willful
misunderstanding of the rights held by Native communities, including
Alaska Native Villages.
226. See discussion supra Part III.
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“[t]he ultimate preservation and continuation of [Native
American] cultures depends on our children and their proper
growth and development.”227

227. ICWA Hearing, supra note 1, at 169 (statement of Bobby George, director
of the Navajo Office of Resource Security).

